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Abstract
The quality of public schools is often cited as an important attribute which distinguishes a community. Indeed, a
recent public opinion poll conducted by the California Public Education Partnership indicates that residents rank
improvements in public education higher than such high profile issues as environmental quality and crime
reduction. In order to explore the role of educational quality in determining residential property values, a
hedonic housing price model is used on a large sample of homes which sold within Fresno County in California
over the period 1990-1994. After controlling for a wide range of housing characteristics and neighborhood
features, the findings indicate that the school district does significantly influence the real sale price. Then the
relative importance of inputs into the production of educational services is investigated as compared to output
measures of productivity. These findings suggest that both input and output measures are important. However,

elasticity estimates of input measures tend to be higher than those of output measures, with the average class
size by far the strongest influence. There is some evidence to suggest that the benefits of additional teachers
likely outweigh the costs. Finally, the findings suggest that attributes of schools are more highly valued by local
residents than either crime or environmental quality measures within the community.

Introduction
Economists have long understood that the structural attributes of a dwelling as well as the characteristics of the
neighborhood in which it is located are important determinants of dwelling value. The hedonic or implicit
markets model of household behavior, developed from the path breaking works of Lancaster (1969) and Rosen
(1974), has been used extensively to estimate the impact on dwelling value of both types of attributes. Kern and
Liehtenstein (1987), Linneman (1980), and others estimate the impact on value of structural attributes of a
dwelling. Others estimate the influence of a wide range of neighborhood factors, including fiscal and regulatory
characteristics of a community (Stull and Stull 1991), crime rates (Thaler 1979), proximity to employment
centers and subcenters (Bender and Hwang 1985), air quality (Ridker and Henning 1967; Harrison and Rubinfeld
1978), proximity to an incinerator (Keil and McClain 1995) and other environmental hazards (Nelson 1981;
Bernknopf et al. 1990). Several studies have identified public school quality as another significant determinant of
locational choice and property values. For example, Hayes and Taylor (1996), Walden (1990), Jud and Watts
(1981), and Rosen and Fullerton (1977) show a positive link between property values and various measures of
student performance.
The issue of public school quality has been the focus of strong public debate in California. Historically ranked
among the best public schools in the country, California experienced dramatic declines in recent years. For
example, the state currently has the 49th lowest teacher-student ratio in the nation. Recently, the California
Public Education Partnership (CPEP), a group of professional education organizations, published a widely
acclaimed public opinion survey designed to gauge what Californians want from their public schools.1 The survey
results indicate that the typical Californian places a much higher priority on improved public education than on
environmental improvement or crime reduction. Moreover, Californians indicate that they are willing to pay
more to improve public education even if it means paying more taxes.
Gov. Gray Davis made education the centerpiece of his campaign as well as his inaugural address and his state of
the state speech. Moreover, his landslide victory as the "education governor" is consistent with the results of
the CPEP opinion survey. In an attempt to reform the state educational system, Davis recently unveiled a $440
million package of school reforms centered on a statewide exit exam that all students must pass in order to
graduate from high school. Other aspects of the plan range from after-hours tutorial programs to more rigorous
performance reviews of teachers.2
Californians thus seem to be paying much closer attention to the quality of the schools in their communities. The
popularity of Davis' proposals for more statewide standards suggests that people may believe that a wide
variance in school quality exists now. If this is the case, assuming prospective buyers (1) perceive school quality
differences and (2) are mobile between neighborhoods in different districts, then housing prices should adjust to
these perceived school quality differences. That is, school quality (as reflected in various performance measures)
is said to be capitalized into property values. While this approach does not give an indication of how qualitative
changes in schools impact educational productivity, it does implicitly value characteristics of public schools by
examining the degree to which housing prices increase, other things equal, when a school quality attribute
changes.
This paper applies the hedonic model to data for Fresno County, California to test directly if households consider
various attributes of public schools in their location choice decisions, and if so, what attributes appear to be

most influential. Fresno County is chosen because it is a relatively large county with numerous school districts
varying in both size and scope of activity. To avoid problems of misspecification, a wide range of local
neighborhood characteristics are controlled in addition to measures of school quality. These findings lend some
support to the argument that school attributes influence the sales price of residential properties.

Empirical Model
Theoretical background.

The theory underlying the hedonic model has been developed and reproduced in detail many times and will only
be reviewed briefly here. In its essence, the single stage hedonic model views housing as a differentiated bundle
of characteristics of both the structure and the neighborhood in which the structure is located. Assuming (i)
perfect information about the bundle of attributes embodied in each house, (ii) zero transactions costs in
market trades of bundles (and hence perfect mobility), and (iii) a continuous offering of attributes, the market
price of a house can be represented as 𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧), where 𝑧𝑧 = 𝑧𝑧1 , 𝑧𝑧2 , . . . , 𝑧𝑧𝑛𝑛 is a vector of structural and neighborhood
attributes. The implicit price of attribute j is then given by the partial derivative of 𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧) with respect to attribute
j, or 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 (𝑧𝑧) = 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕/𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑗𝑗 .3 The equilibrium price function, 𝑝𝑝(𝑧𝑧), is generally thought to be nonlinear because the
cost of arbitrage activity that repackages bundles of attributes once a house is built is assumed prohibitive.

Geographic region and data.

A hedonic model is estimated using a sample of properties sold in Fresno County during the period 1990-1994.
Property sales data were obtained from a private firm (TRW REDI-Property) and represent individual single
family residential home sales that took place over this five year period.
TRW REDI-Property (now Experian) obtains data from weekly new deed reports from the county recorder's
office, and merges these data with data from the yearly county tax rolls. Additional information (e.g., for
structural characteristics) about the properties is obtained from various appraisal groups because not all
counties obtain information at the same level of detail. In California there are two situations that would result in
a property sale not being included in the TRW REDI data set: (i) A specific request for nondisclosure by the
owner (usually a well-known individual who would not want the public to know the price of the property) and;
(ii) the property tax information is not located on the first page of the recorder's document, which is the source
of information for TRW REDI-Property. The first situation is likely to systematically undercount high priced
properties. However, given the geographic location of this housing market, this undercount is not likely to bias
the findings. Furthermore, TRW has indicated that the second situation is unlikely to introduce systematic bias
into the sample. TRW estimates that 46 percent of the approximately 6 million properties had property tax data.
The sample obtained for Fresno county contains 6,837 observations.

Model specification.

To avoid misspecification biases and mitigate problems associated with unmeasured spatially correlated
influences, the model controls for a variety of housing influences. These variables can be classified as falling into
one of five broad categories; Structure, Neighborhood, Year Sold, School District, and School Attributes. A
semilog specification is chosen4 and is represented by equation (1).
(1) 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝) = 𝑓𝑓(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆, 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)

Table 1 provides variable definitions, data sources, descriptive statistics, and a priori sign expectations. Onetailed hypothesis tests can be used when there is a sign prediction. The dependent variable (In(real price)) is the
log of real sale price of housing and is deflated by the housing component of the CPI for the month in which the
property sold.

Structural variables.

The first category of variables, Structure, represents structural features of the house. Among the variables
contained in this category are the number of bedrooms, full and half baths (full baths, half baths), the number of
fireplaces, the age of the structure in linear and quadratic form (house age, age squared), the lot size on which
the structure is located, and size of the structure measured in square feet. These attributes should serve to
increase property value. Thus all structural characteristics with the exception of house age and age squared are
expected to have positive coefficients in the hedonic regression. Concerning the effect of age on real price,
maintenance costs may rise with the age of the structure. However, it is also possible that some qualitative
features of homes (e.g., hardwood floors, crown molding, etc.) may only be found on older properties. To allow
for nonmonotonicity in the hedonic housing price function, age is included in quadratic form.

Neighborhood and time trend variables.

Black's (1998) summary of studies that measure the effect of school quality on housing prices emphasizes the
importance of neighborhood controls. She questions Jud and Watts' (1981) conclusions because they control for
so few neighborhood attributes in studying a school district that covers a large, diverse geographic area. She
mentions that Hayes and Taylor (1996) and Black (1997) have addressed this problem by studying smaller
geographic areas but notes that generalizing the results to wider areas is a limitation. This work is extended here
by studying all the unified and high school districts in Fresno County. Countywide neighborhood diversity is
controlled by including a much richer set of neighborhood attributes than do any of these other works. Because
of the broader coverage, these results generalize to both urban and suburban schools in this county.
Since the TRW-REDI Property data comes geocoded to the street address, a wide range of neighborhood
characteristics can be matched to each property. The MapInfo PC-based GIS package is used to map each
variable to the associated property. Each property is matched to a census tract and the characteristics of that
tract are then assigned to the property. Among the tract characteristics included are the percent of the houses
that are occupied units, the percent of the occupied units that are owner occupied, and the racial and ethnic mix
of the tract (percent Black, percent Asian, and percent Hispanic). Also included in this set of demographic
controls is the median income of the households in the tract and the percent of the tract that is receiving public
assistance. Finally, proximity to the workplace is measured by the average commute time for the census tract.
While it would be desirable to have these measures defined for each year of the sample, 1990 values must be
used since they are the most recently available Census data.
Neighborhoods with relatively higher rates of occupied units, owner occupancy and median income are
expected to exhibit higher sale prices since the sample is comprised of single-family homes. On the other hand,
higher rates of households on public assistance should lower prices because of negative neighborhood
externalities associated with high poverty rates. In addition, the urban location model predicts that lower
commute times should result in higher sale prices, ceteris paribus. Finally, the expected impact of the racial and
ethnic variables is unknown a priori since the race/ethnicity of the buyers, which may proxy individual
preferences, are unknown.
GIS tools are also used to determine how close each property is to various types of noxious activity. Specifically,
activity related to proximity to interstate highways and railroads is examined, as well as air quality in the
neighborhood. Since ozone monitors are not uniformly dispersed throughout metropolitan areas, but rather are
placed in areas that are more likely to have higher ozone levels, a distance weighted value for ozone is
constructed, which is the reading from the closest monitor divided by the distance from that monitor. Proximity
to hazardous materials is proxied by the presence of Superfund sites within a 3 mile radius of each property, the
presence of hazardous waste sites within a 1 mile radius, and the presence of manufacturing facilities on the

toxic release inventory within a 1 mile radius. Overall, one would expect that proximity to noxious activity
reduces the sale price of the property.
Four other factors that roughly fall into this category of noxious activity variables are airport noise, earthquake
risk, proximity to a correctional facility, and local crime rates. Proximity to airport noise is also a distance
weighted measure, computed as the number of takeoffs and landings at the closest airport divided by the
distance from that airport. Also, a dummy variable for earthquake is defined as unity if the zip code in which the
property is located is classified as an area being at moderate risk for a quake and zero if there is low risk. A
dummy variable equal to one if the dwelling is located within one mile of a correctional facility measures the
NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) phenomenon and the murder rate per 10,000 population captures the impact of
violent crime activity.5 All four of these factors are expected to lower property values. Proximity to a stream is
included to proxy access to aesthetic and recreational amenities. Congestion is captured by a variable measuring
population density and the property tax rate for the residence is included to measure the local property tax
burden.6
The data set also contains information about the political jurisdiction in which each dwelling lies. To account for
amenities and disamenities associated with the residence being in the central city, a dummy variable for Fresno
is included. This variable should capture unmeasured features of the city not picked up by the other variables in
the Neighborhood vector.
Some households choose to place their children in private schools if they perceive the benefits of doing so to be
greater than the tuition, extra transport, and other incidental costs involved with private enrollment. This is
presumably more likely in neighborhoods where public school quality is perceived to be worse. The percentage
of census tract students enrolled in a private school is added to control this effect.
Finally, dichotomous variables equal to one for the year in which the property is sold and zero otherwise, are
added to control for market trends over the sample period (1990-1994). The omitted year is 1990.

School District and School Attribute variables.

The School District vector contains dichotomous variables for each of the 12 school districts in the sample.7
These variables take on a value of one for dwellings located in that district and zero otherwise. Controversy
exists concerning whether more resources devoted to education production affect student performance and
thus school quality. For example, Bradbury et al. (1995), Sonstelie and Portney (1980), and Oates (1969) all find a
positive relationship between property values and school spending. Moreover, in a test of the optimal provision
of local public services, Brueckner (1982) finds educational spending levels are efficient. Other authors find no
relationship between property values and school spending (Hayes and Taylor 1996). The problem may be the
weak link between expenditures and objective measures of school inputs or outputs. Hanushek (1998)
summarizes the evidence: "...there is no strong or consistent relationship between school resources and student
performance." (1998, p. 19)8.
It should be noted that the hedonic model does not measure the marginal effectiveness of inputs in an
education production function. Rather, it estimates the value of these attributes to local residents. Because the
capitalization of perceived quality in property values is tested for, and because there is disagreement on
whether quality can be measured by the amount of financial inputs, the School Attributes vector contains
measures of both inputs and outputs. The data come from the California Department of Education, Educational
Testing Services (ETS) and the U.S. Census.
The focus is on three different specifications. The first includes only dummy variables for each school district to
determine whether significant variation in home sale prices results from the school district. The second
specification includes direct measures of inputs and the third model utilizes output measures. Hanushek (1998)

carefully documents over a 100 year period, a national trend of rising teacher-student ratios at the same time
that real teacher salaries have also risen. He notes that this suggests a long-term policy of attempting to raise
quality by lowering average class size. Moreover, Hanushek and Rivkin (1997) indicate that the increase in
special education has helped raise the teacher-student ratio and increase per pupil spending in an attempt to
increase quality. For these reasons, the teacher-student ratio and the number of pupil services personnel per
school in each school district are included as two input measures in Specification #2. The number of schools in
the district may capture the positive impact of more opportunities or the negative effect of a larger bureaucracy
associated with a larger district. Likewise, school size, which represents the average enrollment per school, may
capture the same effects at the school level. Finally, consistent with Jud and Watts (1981), minority enrollments
are used to see if desegregation affects perceived quality by influencing housing prices. Three variables
measuring the percentage of racial and ethnic enrollments (Black enrollment, Asian enrollment, Hispanic
enrollment) in the census tract where the household is located are used9. These input measures can affect the
valuation of schools by serving as proxies for numerous factors including differential preferences for diversity in
student populations, or peer group effects if a particular minority population is on average more or less
productive than the general student population10.
Three output measures are used for Specification #3. The percentage of the senior class that took the SAT, the
percentage of the junior and senior classes that took advanced placement (AP) exams, and the high school
dropout rate.11 The variables SAT and advanced placement measure the proportion of graduates who plan to
pursue higher education. In fact, many colleges and universities routinely award credit toward graduation for
successful advanced placement performance.

Empirical Findings
White's test reveals a heteroskedastic error structure in all specifications. This problem is corrected for, using
White's (1980) correction technique. Regression results for Specification #1 are presented in Table 2. This
hedonic model provides a reasonably good fit to the data, explaining 80.3 percent of the variation in the log of
the real sale price. Furthermore, all of the coefficients on the structural characteristics are significant and have
the expected sign when there is an a priori sign prediction.12 The coefficients on house age and age squared
imply that real price declines with age until the property is approximately 128 years old, after which time it
begins to rise. Since the oldest property in the sample is 83 years, age has a negative impact on the real price.
Focusing on the Neighborhood vector, 11 of the 22 coefficients are correctly signed (when there was a sign
expectation) and statistically significant at the 5 percent level.13 The coefficients on air quality, occupied units,
public assistance, and Superfund are anomalous and may reflect the effects of uncontrolled factors. Only four
coefficients are insignificant.
The racial and ethnic variables percent Asian, percent Black, and percent Hispanic are all significant which
suggests that high concentrations of these groups are associated with lower sale prices. Also, the coefficient on
murder rate suggests that housing prices are 7.28 percent lower in areas with one additional murder per 10,000
people. The hedonic equation also shows that a 1 percent increase in the number of students enrolled in private
schools lowers real housing prices by 0.48 percent, which may reflect public school quality concerns. Specifically,
if low quality in the public schools drives residents to enroll their children in private schools, then the private
school quality variable is serving as a proxy for public school quality. The significant coefficients in the Year Sold
vector suggest that, compared to 1990, prices rose in 1992 and then fell in 1994, the last year of the sample.
This is consistent with the housing market slump that struck most of California in the early 1990's.
The coefficients on the School District dummies show that sale prices do indeed vary across school districts,
ceteris paribus.14 They indicate that prices are lower than those in Kingsburg, which is the omitted district.15

Seven coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level and Laton is significant at 5 percent. Only two (Parlier
and Tranquility) are insignificant.
To confirm statistically that school districts affect housing prices, another regression including only the
Structure, Neighborhood (including private school), and Year Sold vectors (which restricts the coefficients in
School District to equal zero) was estimated. Then the significance of the entire School District vector was tested
by computing an F-statistic that compares the explanatory power of these two regressions. The computed Fvalue is 15.85, which is significant at 1 percent. These results suggest that households do in fact consider schools
in their location choice decisions and that they perceive some districts as better than others as reflected in
housing price premiums in those school districts.
There was an attempt to discern the features households use to distinguish between districts by considering the
School Attributes variables. Table 3 reports the results of Specifications #2 and #3.16 The racial and ethnic
enrollment variables (Asian enrollment, Black enrollment, and Hispanic enrollment) are interacted with the
corresponding percentage of the neighborhood population in each racial and ethnic group (percent Asian,
percent Black, and percent Hispanic) in the input specification. This is done to test whether the effect of minority
enrollment on real prices is influenced by neighborhood minority population.17 An examination of the individual
coefficients reveals that only the Asian and Hispanic interaction terms are statistically significant with both being
positive. This may suggest that local residents in these neighborhoods prefer schools with high minority
concentrations. For ease of interpretation, Table 3 reports the findings of joint significance tests for the
combined minority enrollment coefficient and the neighborhood concentration term (i.e., evaluated at the
mean neighborhood concentration). A 1 percent increase in Asian enrollment increases housing prices 0.17
percent, but is significant at only the 10 percent level in a 2-tailed test. The coefficients on Black enrollment and
Hispanic enrollment are insignificant18. Also significant at 1 percent is the coefficient on teacher-student ratio,
implying that an extra teacher per 100 students district-wide increases housing prices by 16 percent.19
The teacher-student ratio coefficient merits further discussion. The 16 percent increase in housing prices does
not, per se, consider the cost associated with adding an extra teacher per 100 students. This cost would be in
the form of higher taxes which, ceteris paribus, would lower housing prices. The actual impact on prices would
then be the increase due to an extra teacher per 100 students net of the decrease due to higher tax levies.
However, this type of balanced-budget method of interpreting the impact of more teachers is inappropriate for
California for two reasons. First, the aforementioned Serrano decision that requires statewide spending
equalization weakens the link between local hiring and local financing. Second, Proposition 13, passed in 1978,
severely limited local districts' ability to finance public schools. Proposition 13 immediately lowered school
district revenues by about one-third. The state was able to replace most of the funds out of a budget surplus.
The state has maintained its leading role in financing public education ever since and currently supplies
approximately two-thirds of public school funds.20 Proposition 13 also mandates property tax rates of no more
than 1 percent of the assessed value and allows reassessment only when the property is sold. Thus the link
between hiring more teachers and property tax levies is tenuous in California.21
If increases in the teacher-student ratio were financed exclusively from local revenue sources, the 16 percent
would be a gross estimate and the net impact could be easily computed by adding to it the (negative) coefficient
on property tax. Because of the state's dominant role in funding, however, this coefficient can be interpreted
primarily as the net impact on prices of an increase in the teacher-student ratio because the state tax burden is
not capitalized locally (i.e., it does not vary within Fresno County). Moreover, it seems reasonable that the state
tax cost of hiring more teachers would be negligible unless the hiring were done for all districts in the state.
While precise comparisons of benefits and costs associated with hiring additional teachers are not possible, the
findings can be used to ask an interesting "what if" question. Specifically, what if the local property tax was used

to increase the number of teachers by one per 100 students? These results do suggest that there are likely net
benefits associated with hiring additional teachers even if the expense were funded entirely by local property
taxes. Specifically, given the expense of new teachers, it appears that the increase in property values from more
teachers would outweigh the lower property values from a higher local property tax burden.22
The negative coefficient on services personnel, which suggests prices fall by 4.3 percent for an extra staff
member per 1,000 students, appears to proxy negative school qualities. Pupil service personnel includes
coaches, secretarial staff and counselors. It may be that districts with larger numbers of counselors for troubled
students are perceived as lower quality. Finally, the negative sign on number of schools is capturing undesirable
aspects of larger districts. For example, parents may perceive larger districts to be less personal or less
responsive to their needs. An extra school, ceteris paribus, lowers housing prices 0.24 percent. However, the
positive sign on school size suggests that an extra 100 students per school raises housing prices by 2.67 percent.
These last two coefficients require further discussion. They suggest that higher quality due to larger size occurs
at the school, not the district level. This may imply that parents focus mainly on the schools their children
attend. A larger school, for example, may be able to offer a wider choice of AP subjects because there is a large
enough critical mass of students to support them. From the parents' perspective, a large district would be less
important than what is available at the particular school their child attends. The signs on number of schools and
school size may suggest parents perceive that administrative quality is determined at the district level while
instructional quality is determined at the school level. Moreover, they imply that larger districts hamper
administrative effectiveness but larger schools enhance teaching and learning opportunities.23
Specification #3 uses three measures of educational output to assess quality. All three coefficients have the
expected sign. Advanced placement is significant at 1 percent in a 1-tailed test and SAT is significant at 5
percent. A 1 percent increase in the number of students taking AP exams raises housing prices 0.59 percent
while a 1 percent increase in those taking the SAT raises prices 0.34 percent. The coefficient on dropout rate is
significant at 10 percent in a 1-tailed test. It suggests that a 1 percent increase in the high school dropout rate
lowers housing prices 0.36 percent. These three coefficients show clearly that households gauge school quality
by assessing student performance according to commonly accepted criteria.23 Jud and Watts (1981) and Black
(1997) use test scores to measure quality. Interestingly, when actual performance levels on the SAT and AP tests
were investigated, none of these variables were statistically significant. This may be due to problems associated
with the use of average test scores, rather than more complete measures of the distribution of those scores
(which were unavailable), in assessing the quality of college preparation at the district level.
Although all three equations perform well overall, the insignificant coefficients in each may be due to some
underlying multicollinearity.24 A high degree of multicollinearity associated with median income as well as the
ethnic enrollment variables in the input equation (all measured at the census tract level) was found, which may
account for their small t-ratios25.
The impacts of the school attribute measures on real housing prices in specifications #2 and #3 are not directly
comparable because the variables are measured differently. Table 4 shows unit-free elasticities that allow a
comparison of the relative magnitudes of each school quality measure. In addition, to illustrate how relatively
large absolute changes in the independent variable influence housing prices, the percent change in the
dependent variable resulting from a one standard deviation change in continuous independent variables was
examined.26
Although all the computed elasticities are less than one, the teacher-student ratio elasticity is nearly 5 times the
magnitude of the next largest measure. This is consistent with Hanushek's (1998) discussion of the concurrent
rise in teacher-student ratios and real teacher salaries over the past century. Households do appear to take

smaller classes as a more important indicator of quality than other measures. This result may also indicate that
former governor Wilson's highly publicized and well-received push for smaller classes statewide is reflective of
parental preferences in California.27
A few other interesting observations can be made. In general the elasticities on input measures are larger than
those on output measures. This may be due to the nature of these output measures, which primarily measure
high school quality. It may be that households with young children or those planning children in the near future
discount the future sufficiently to make these measures of high school quality relatively less important. The
small elasticities on the minority enrollment variables indicate that perceived benefits of segregation are
relatively less important. In fact, the percent Black and percent Hispanic elasticities are the lowest. Of the output
measures, the percentage of students taking the SAT has the highest elasticity, although it is less than 0.1.
A similar pattern emerges from an examination of large absolute changes in various independent variables, with
input measures generally affecting property values to a greater extent than output measures. For example,
increasing the school size by 214 students would raise property values by 5.7 percent, whereas reducing the
overall district by 25 schools (a change possible only in the 2 largest districts) would increase real values by 5.9
percent. Highlighting the importance of the teacher-student ratio, reducing the district-wide average class size
by 1.6 students would raise property values by 5.2 percent. On the output side, a 9 percent increase in the
percent of seniors taking the SAT increases property values by 3.1 percent and an increase in the percent of
junior and senior students taking advanced placement exams increases real values by 2.7 percent.
The California Public Education Partnership survey findings indicate the relative importance of school quality as
compared to reduction in crime or improvements in environmental quality. Thus, elasticities for measures of
environmental quality and crime were also derived. Note that only elasticities for coefficients which were of the
expected sign, and statistically significant at the 95 percent level of confidence or higher, were reported. In
addition, since dummy variables are noncontinuous, the percent change in the sale price from a unit change in
the dummy variable was computed, rather than computing elasticity measures for those variables. These
findings from the hedonic model generally support the findings of the public opinion survey. Specifically, the
elasticity on teacher-student ratio is nearly 8 times that of murder rate and just over 10 times that of the largest
environmental quality measure (interstate). It should be noted however that the murder rate elasticity does
rank higher than all school attribute elasticities except teacher-student ratio, service personnel and school size.

Conclusions and Policy Implications
This paper considers the relative importance of the school district, as well as the separate influences of inputs
and outputs as determinants of residential home prices. Moreover, this is done by using a rich data set that
allows a very wide range of locational attributes of houses to be controlled for. After also controlling for
numerous structural features, it was found that the school district in which the property is located is an
important determinant of residential home sale prices. A detailed investigation of input and output measures
reveals that both are statistically important factors in local real estate markets.
Table 4 shows that the policy implications of the elasticity and absolute change computations are consistent.
Specifically, residents value input measures more than output measures. This may result from difficulty in
measuring output quality, or from the aforementioned problem associated with this measurement of school
quality. Nonetheless, class size reduction does appear to be a successful policy. Expansion of this initiative
beyond the current K through 3 mandate in California would probably be deemed worthwhile by residents. The
computations for school size and number of schools suggest that home buyers place greater value on the
empowerment of individual schools rather than on district-wide initiatives. While the issue of racial and ethnic
integration in public schools continues, the insignificance of the various coefficients, and the small magnitudes

of the computations associated with the minority enrollment variables suggest that this is relatively unimportant
in home buyers' perceptions of school districts. Finally, school attribute measures are found to be relatively
more important than environmental quality of life measures.
These findings may also improve if data could be disaggregated to the school rather than just the district level
since qualitative and quantitative measures of school quality do differ between schools within the same district.
In spite of these shortcomings, these results do show that households sort themselves according to school
district attributes and these differentials appear to be capitalized into residential home prices. Finally, note that
while these findings are specific to the school districts within Fresno County, it is believed that they provide
insights which generalize to other areas as well. Verification of similar impacts in other areas would serve to
guide public policy makers attempting to identify the factors most important to local residents.

NOTES
1. The survey, "What Californians want from their public schools. Priority one: schools that work," is available
from the Center for the Future of Teaching and Learning, Santa Cruz, CA, and can be found at
http://www.cftl.org/ca-want/priority-onel.html.
2. California political writers Sigrid Bathen and Steve Scott discuss Davis' focus on education in detail in the
California Journal (June 1997, January 1999), which provides an ostensibly independent analysis of
politics and government.
3. Rosen (1974) shows that this implicit price does not necessarily represent an individual's willingness to pay for
the attribute. The implicit price can be used to derive the demand for an attribute in a second stage
estimation process. However, Brown and Rosen (1982), Diamond and Smith (1985), Epple (1987), Bartik
(1987) and others have noted the existence of identification problems that make estimation of these
demand functions difficult. Our work need only focus on the single stage model.
4. The issue of functional form has been investigated extensively in the hedonic literature. Although some
authors (Rasmussen and Zuehlke 1990) advocate flexible functional forms, others have voiced concerns
about the accuracy of implicit prices from such forms (Cassel and Mendelsohn 1985). We explored the
issue of functional form by estimating Box-Cox models on each specification. The Box-Cox model is a
flexible form model which applies the following transformation to the dependent variable: 𝑦𝑦 ∗ = (𝑦𝑦 −
1 𝜆𝜆)/ where 𝑦𝑦 ∗ tends to a linear specification as 𝜆𝜆 → 1 and it tends to a logarithmic specification as 𝜆𝜆 →
0. In all three cases, the parameter estimate of 𝜆𝜆 = 0.242. While the estimate was statistically
different from both zero and one, it is clearly closer to zero. We also note that Cropper, Deck and
McConnell (1988) suggest that the semilog model is preferred when the possibility of a misspecification
exists. While we have been careful in our choice of specification, such a possibility exists with spatially
defined data. In light of these arguments, we have chosen the semi-log model for all three
specifications.
5. The murder rate data are available for only three jurisdictions in Fresno County: the cities of Fresno, Clovis,
and Selma. The countywide averages for Fresno County are also available. Thus, if the property is
located within the three jurisdictions for which we have data, then the citywide average is used.
Otherwise, the county average is used to proxy local crime rates.
6. This is an implied tax rate computed as the annual tax bill as a percentage of the assessed value after the sale.
7. The 12 districts are Central, Clovis, Coalinga, Fowler, Fresno City, Kingsburg, Laton, Parlier, Sanger, Selma,
Tranquility, and Washington. The mean values of these dummy variables ranges from a high of 0.646
(Fresno) to a low of 0.0004 (Laton). No properties in two small districts (Caruthers and Golden Plains)
are in the sample.
8. The use of expenditure data is further complicated by California spending equalization that began with the
state Supreme Court's decision in Serrano v. Priest (1974). This ruling establishes spending limits for local
school districts, with poorer districts allowed to increase per pupil spending more rapidly than wealthier
ones, thereby narrowing spending gaps over time.

9. The minority enrollment data are defined at the census tract level and are taken from the 1990 Census of
Population and Housing rather than at the school district level. As such, they more closely reflect
neighborhood school measures. Unfortunately, California Department of Education data, which are
defined annually, do not report breakouts on individual minority groups.
10. Fresno County is in the heart of California's San Joaquin Valley, the state's largest agricultural region. Large
groups of migrant workers live there for at least part of the year. Although this can impact school
quality, we believe this is unlikely for two reasons. First, this is an urban county with 93 percent of the
properties located in census tracts with less than 1 percent of the land in agricultural use and 77 percent
in tracts with no agricultural land use. Second, our percent Hispanic and Hispanic enrollment variables
should adequately control for any effect migrant workers have on perceived school quality.
11. It is possible that school quality can vary significantly within a given district. Unfortunately most of our
quality measures are only available at the district level, and hence we cannot test this possibility.
12. Holding constant dwelling size by including square feet results in the negative coefficient on bedrooms,
which implies that households value larger rooms.
13. The coefficients on hazardous waste, median income and property tax are significant at the 10 percent level
in 1-tailed-tests.
14. One might suspect that proxies for school quality are likely to be endogenous in the hedonic regression since
higher quality housing would generate higher tax revenues which could lead to higher spending in
schools. Because this is micro data, however, an increase in the value of a single house will have no
appreciable effect on tax revenue and school quality
15. We choose Kingsburg as the omitted district because its schools appear to command the highest housing
price premium. There were only two observations in one small district (Coalinga), which are included in
the omitted category to avoid a singularity in estimating the hedonic equation. The negative coefficients
on all the other variables in the School District vector are thus more easily compared.
16. The different school quality measures did not significantly change the parameter estimates in control
categories (Structure, Neighborhood and Year Sold). We thus choose to focus only on the school quality
measures in Table 3. Full regression results are available upon request from the authors.
17. Note that correlations between the racial/ethnic characteristics of the neighborhood and of school
enrollment is very high, with simple correlations exceeding 0.90 for all three minority groups.
18. Coefficients on Asian enrollment, Black enrollment, and Hispanic enrollment were also estimated without the
interaction terms. Only the coefficient on Asian enrollment (0.0022) is significant.
19. The sample mean value of teacher-student ratio, 0.0423, implies an average class size of 23.6.
20. The passage of Proposition 98 in 1988, which mandates that at least 40 percent of the state budget be
allocated to K-12 public education, attests to the dominant role of the state in education funding.
21. The severity of Proposition 13 has led to the creation of Mello-Roos Community Facilities Districts. New
properties within these districts are assessed fees generally less than 1 percent of their market value to
augment funding for schools and other public facilities like parks and libraries. However, Mello-Roos
levies are used only to finance new construction. Interestingly, Do and Sirmans (1994) evaluate the
property value impacts of Mello-Roos payments on new developments in California. They find that the
annual tax assessments that are used to finance public expenditures including schools significantly
reduce property values.
22. First we compute the expected benefit from the increasing the teacher-student ratio by one additional
teacher per 100 students. The hedonic regression predicts that property values would increase 15.97
percent from such a change (i.e., the coefficient on the teacher student ratio in the input equation is
15.97 and hence 0.1597 = 15.97 ∗ 0.01). Note that an increase in the teacher student ratio of 0.01 is
substantial given that the standard deviation of the variable in our sample is 0.017. Next, we consider
how high local property taxes would need to rise to offset this rise in property values. If we assume that
the additional expenses were borne completely by increases in local property taxes, the property tax
rate could increase 3.54 percent (i.e., more than three times its current level) before the property values
would decrease by 15.97 percent. That is, given that the coefficient on the property tax is -4.5086,

ln (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) = (0.1597/−4.5086) = 0.0354. Finally, we consider the expense associated
with increasing the teacher student ratio. For the school districts in Fresno county over the period we
considered, an increase of one teacher per 100 students would require the hiring of 55 additional
teachers. Assuming that the average teacher salary is $26,083 (American Federation of Teachers 1996)
in Fresno County, and assuming that fringes are 20 percent, this represents an expense of $1.72 million
in 1996. Deflating this to 1994 dollars gives an annual county-wide expense of $1.64 million. On a
property tax base of approximately $43.1 million in 1994-95, this represents an increase in per capita
property tax expenses of 3.8 percent. Thus, while we cannot say precisely how the marginal benefit of
hiring additional teachers compares with the additional costs, it is likely that hiring additional teachers
generates benefits that outweigh the additional costs since it is unlikely that the property tax rate would
need to triple to increase per capita tax revenue by 3.8 percent.
23. We added, in separate regressions, the average number of administrators per student, the average number
of administrators per school, and the total number of administrators in the district to see if number of
schools might be picking up some type of bureaucratic diseconomies in larger districts. The results were
insignificant and did not alter the sign or significance of number of schools.
24. The previously mentioned California Public Education Partnership survey lists higher test scores, lower
dropout rates, and higher college attendance as the three most important indicators of school
improvement.
25. We examine the relationships between regressors by computing variance inflation factors (VIFs) for each
school attribute, median income, and all the other insignificant coefficients in the regressions. VIFs are
computed as 1/(1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖2 ), where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖2 is the coefficient of determination from the regression of the ith
explanatory variable on all the other regressors in the primary equation. They are called variance
inflation factors because higher values increase the variances of the estimated coefficients in the
primary equation. A common rule of thumb is that a VIF of 10 or greater (i.e., if 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖2 exceeds 0.90) is
indicative of a multicollinearity problem (Kleinbaum et al. 1988).
26. The VIFs exceed 10 for median income (12.53), Asian enrollment (16.86), Black enrollment (13.02) and
Hispanic enrollment (27.39). The only other variable with a VIF exceeding 10 is murder rate in the input
equation. Its t-ratio of-1.74, however, and is significant at 5 percent in a one-tailed test. None of the
insignificant coefficients in the other two equations have VIFs exceeding 10.
27. Note that we use the mean and standard deviation across school districts and census tracts, rather than our
property sales sample, to compute the values for input and output measures reported in Table 4. The
elasticities are thus computed by multiplying each coefficient by the mean value of the corresponding
variable. Large changes are computed by multiplying the coefficient times the standard deviation of the
independent variable, or β ⋅ σ.
28. The current California mandate applies only for grades K through 3.

Table 1. Variable Name and Definition, Data Source, Descriptive Statistics and Predicted Sign
Dependent Variable and
Variables in the Structure
Category
Variable Name
Definition [mean, standard deviation]
Real price
Real sale price of the property (1990 dollars)
[𝜇𝜇 = 94,421, 𝜎𝜎 = 51,885]
Bedrooms
No. of bedrooms in house
[𝜇𝜇 = 2.98, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.64]
Fireplaces
No. of fireplaces in house
[𝜇𝜇 = 0.73, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.53]
Full bath
No. of full bathrooms in house
[𝜇𝜇 = 1.78, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.54]
Half baths
No. of half bathrooms in house
[𝜇𝜇 = 0.07, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.25]
Lot size
Lot size in square feet
[𝜇𝜇 = 10,197, 𝜎𝜎 = 16,956]
Square feet
Structure size in square feet
[𝜇𝜇 = 1,562, 𝜎𝜎 = 536]
House age, age squared
Age of house in years, age squared
[𝜇𝜇 of ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 27.09, 𝜎𝜎 = 18.85]
Variables in the Neighborhood
and Year Sold Categories
Air quality
Distance weighted value of the nearest ozone monitor,
computed as ozone concentration/distance of monitor to
property
[𝜇𝜇 = 2.43, 𝜎𝜎 = 2.36]
Airport noise
Distance weighted value of nearest airport, computed as
number of airport operations/distance of airport to
property in miles
[𝜇𝜇 = 37,348, 𝜎𝜎 = 32,249]
Commute time
Average household travel time to work in the census tract
[𝜇𝜇 = 20.83, 𝜎𝜎 = 1.68]
Correctional facility
1 = correctional facility within 1 mile of dwelling, O
otherwise
[𝜇𝜇 = 0.02, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.14]

Source
TRW nominal price divided by
the national CPI for housing
TRW

Predicted Sign
In (real price) is the
dependent variable
+

TRW

+

TRW

+

TRW

+

TRW

+

TRW

+

TRW

?

EPA-AIRS AQS
database

-

TRW

-

Census STF-3A

-

MapInfo computed

-

Earthquake

Fresno
Hazardous waste

Interstate
Median income
Murder rate
Occupied units
Owner occupied
Percent Asian
Percent Black
Percent Hispanic
Population density

Earthquake risk classification of the zip code in which the
property is located, equals 1 for moderate risk and O for
low risk
[𝜇𝜇 = 0.001, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.04]
1 = dwelling lies within the Fresno city
political boundaries, 0 = otherwise
[𝜇𝜇 = 0.88, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.33]
1 = at least one hazardous waste
treatment facility within 1 mile of the property,
0=otherwise
[𝜇𝜇 = 0.04, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.20]
1 = interstate highway within 0.25
miles of property, 0=otherwise
[𝜇𝜇 = 0.05, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.21]
Median household income of the
census tract
[𝜇𝜇 = 32,228, 𝜎𝜎 = 12,465]
Murder rate per 10,000 population.
[𝜇𝜇 = 1.86, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.58]
Percent of census tract housing
units that are occupied
[𝜇𝜇 = 94.93, 𝜎𝜎 = 2.87]
Percent of census tract housing
units that are owner occupied
[𝜇𝜇 = 57.89, 𝜎𝜎 = 15.67]
Percent of census tract population
that is Asian or Pacific Islander
[𝜇𝜇 = 8.24, 𝜎𝜎 = 6.57]
Percent of census tract population
that is Black
[𝜇𝜇 = 4.55, 𝜎𝜎 = 6.67]
Percent of census tract population
that is Hispanic
[𝜇𝜇 = 23.41, 𝜎𝜎 = 15.20]
Population density of the census
tract, measured as people per square mile
[𝜇𝜇 = 4,393, 𝜎𝜎 = 2,782]

Risk Management Associates
study prepared for Freddie
Mac

-

TRW

?

Landview II

-

Maplnfo computed

-

Census STF-3A

+

FBI Uniform Crime Reports

-

Census STF-3A

+

Census STF-3A

+

Census STF-3A

?

Census STF-3A

?

Census STF-3A

?

Census STF-3A

?

Property tax
Public assistance
Railroads
Stream
Superfund

Toxic release

Year
(𝑖𝑖 = 1991, … ,1994)

Variables In the School
Attributes Category
Private school
Asian enrollment
Black enrollment
Hispanic enrollment

1994 tax payment /1994 assessed
value
[𝜇𝜇 = 0.01, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.002]
Percent of census tract population
that is receiving public assistance
[𝜇𝜇 = 14.08, 𝜎𝜎 = 11.26]
1 =railroad tracks within 0.25 miles
of property, 0=otherwise
[𝜇𝜇 = 0.15, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.36]
1 =stream within 0.25 miles of
the property, 0=otherwise
[𝜇𝜇 = 0.31, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.46]
1 =at least 1 site which Is on the
National Priorities List (I.e., Superfund list) within 3 miles of
the property, 0=otherwise
[𝜇𝜇 = 0.35, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.48]
1 =at least 1 manufacturing facility
which Is on the Toxic Release Inventory within 1 mile of the
property, 0=otherwise
[𝜇𝜇 = 0.19, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.54]
1=dwelling sold in ith year,
0=otherwise
[𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 = 0.17, 0.19, 0.23, 0.24]

TRW

-

Census STF-3A

-

Maplnfo Computed

-

Maplnfo computed

?

Landvlew II

-

Landview ll

-

TRW

-

Percentage of students enrolled
In private school in census tract
[𝜇𝜇 = 4.83, 𝜎𝜎 = 2.73]
Percentage of Asian public school
enrollment in census tract
[𝜇𝜇 = 11.26, 𝜎𝜎 = 10.06]
Percentage of Black public school
enrollment in census tract
[𝜇𝜇 = 5.64, 𝜎𝜎 = 6.70]
Percentage of Hispanic public school
enrollment in census tract
[𝜇𝜇 = 30.28, 𝜎𝜎 = 16.70]

Census STF-3A

?

Census STF-3A

?

Census STF-3A

?

Census STF-3A

?

Number of schools
School size
Services personnel

Teacher-student ratio
Advanced placement

Dropout rate
SAT

Number of schools in the district
[𝜇𝜇 = 63.65, 𝜎𝜎 = 31.86]
Average number of students per
school in the district
[𝜇𝜇 = 835.02, 𝜎𝜎 = 137.93]
Average number of nonfaculty
professional service personnel
per 1,000 students
[𝜇𝜇 = 2.72, 𝜎𝜎 = 1.00]
Average district teacher-student
ratio per 100 students
[𝜇𝜇 = 4.23, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.17]
Average district percentage of junior
and senior classes that took
Advanced Placement exams
[𝜇𝜇 = 0.11, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.03]
Average district percentage of
students who drop out of high school
[𝜇𝜇 = 8.35, 𝜎𝜎 = 3.53]
Average district percentage of senior
class that took the SAT exam
[𝜇𝜇 = 0.32, 𝜎𝜎 = 0.06]

California Department of
Education
California Department of
Education

?

California Department of
Education

+

California Department of
Education

+

California Department of
Education

+

California Department of
Education

-

California Department of
Education

+

?

TABLE 2. Full Hedonic Regression with School District Dummies. Dependent Variable-Natural Log of Real Housing
Price
Structure Variables
variable
coefficient t-ratio variable
coefficient t-ratio
intercept
11.86738 87.97 lot size
1.44E-6
2.53
bedrooms
-0.018179 -2.44 square feet
0.000492 30.80
fireplaces
0.054069 8.10
house age
-0.005606 -7.23
full baths
0.034901 3.54
age squared
2.19E-5
2.00
half baths
0.022420 1.68
Neighborhood and Year Sold
air quality
0.001464 1.63
percent Black
-0.007659 -9.41
airport noise
-7.27E-7
-6.56 percent Hispanic -0.005708 -8.75
commute time
-0.003908 -1.72 population dens. -7.91E-7
-0.49
correctional facility
0.036279 0.96
property tax
-4.036278 -1.56
earthquake
-0.216125 -2.98 public assistance 0.001220 1.33
Fresno
0.159348 3.43
railroads
-0.019583 -2.52
hazardous waste
-0.023705 -1.37 stream
-0.004205 -0.69
interstate
-0.065715 -3.94 superfund
0.042854 5.22
median income
8.14E-7
1.30
toxic release
-0.031618 -4.18
murder rate
-0.072823 -3.25 Year1991
0.002513 -0.22
occupied units
-0.006663 -5.38 Year1992
0.036107 3.73
Owner occupied
-0.000261 -0.70 Year1993
-0.005797 -0.48
percent Asian
-0.004151 -6.37 Year1994
-0.061837 -5.53
School District
private school
-0.004788 -3.64 Parlier
-0.109780 -1.02
Central
-0.343022 -9.03 Sanger
-0.198584 -3.95
Clovis
-0.215458 -6.16 Selma
-0.116223 -4.05
Fowler
-0.274788 -2.87 Tranquility
-0.031835 -0.35
Fresno
-0.261072 -7.58 Washington
-0.329040 -6.45
Laton
-0.218544 -2.19
sample size 6,837; F-statistic 618.27; p-value (F) 0.0000; R2 0.804; adj. R2 0.803
TABLE 3: Hedonic Results- School Attributes Variables Dependent Variable-Log of Real Housing Price
Education Inputs Equation
Education Outputs Equation
Variable
Coefficient t-ratio
Variable
Coefficient t-ratio
private school
-0.003996
-2.55
private school
-0.004507
-3.44
Asian enrollment
0.001141a
1.63b
advanced placement
0.005874
3.64
a
b
Black enrollment
0.000919
0.69
dropout rate
-0.003629
-1.50
Hispanic enrollment
-0.000176a -0.20b
SAT
0.003362
2.15
number of schools
-0.002365
-8.42
school size
0.000266
6.11
service personnel
-0.042981
-6.02
t-s ratio
0.159735
5.14
sample size 6,837
sample size 6,837
2
R
0.803
R2
0.801
2
adj. R
0.802
adj. R2
0.800
F-statistic
615.112
F-statistic
719.965

p-value (F) 0.000
p-value (F) 0.000
computed using enrollment coefficients, Interaction coefficients, and evaluated at the mean values of percent
Asian, percent Black, and percent Hispanic respectively:
• 𝜕𝜕 ln (𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝)/𝜕𝜕 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = 0.000948 + 9.62𝐸𝐸 − 5 𝑥𝑥 8.24 = 0.0017
• 𝜕𝜕 ln (𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝)/𝜕𝜕 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = 0.001015 − 2.12𝐸𝐸 − 5 𝑥𝑥 4.55 = 0.0009
• 𝜕𝜕 ln (𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝)𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = −0.001232 + 4.51𝐸𝐸 − 5 𝑥𝑥 23.41 = −0.00017.
b
The standard error for the t-ratio Is computed as the square root of sum of variance of the enrollment
coefficient, the variance of the Interaction coefficient, and two times the covariance between the coefficients.
a

TABLE 4. Comparisons Of School Attributes, Crime, And Environmental Quality Variablesa
EDUCATION INPUTS
VARIABLE
ELASTICITY
private school*
-0.015
Asian enrollment
0.019
Black enrollment
0.005
Hispanic enrollment
-0.007
number of schools*
-0.043
School size*
0.141
service personnel*
-0.131
t-s ratio*
0.690
OUTPUTS
private school*
0.017
advanced placement* 0.044
dropout rate
-0.018
SAT*
0.075
CRIME AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY MEASURES
airport noise*
-0.027
interstate*
-0.066a
murder rate*
-0.088
railroads*
-0.020a
toxic release*
-0.032a
a
computed as percent Δ real price/unit Δ in dichotomous variable.
*Coefficient is significant at the 95 percent level of confidence.

Β*σ
-0.012
0.022
0.010
-0.004
-0.059
0.057
-0.070
0.052
0.014
0.027
-0.013
0.031
-0.023
-0.056
-
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